Storage security using cryptographic splitting

ABSTRACT

Methods and systems for administrative management of a secure data storage network are disclosed. One system includes a secure storage appliance configured to host a plurality of volumes, each volume associated with a plurality of shares stored on a corresponding plurality of physical storage devices and having a plurality of volume management settings, wherein each volume is accessible by a group of one or more users, each user assigned an administrative access level, the volume management settings are editable by a first user from the group of one or more users associated with the volume and assigned an administrative access level sufficient to edit the volume management settings, and the volume management settings are inaccessible by a second user from outside the group of one or more users associated with the volume and assigned an administrative access level at least equal to that of the first user.

RELATED APPLICATIONS

The present disclosure claims the benefit of commonly assigned U.S.patent application Ser. No. 12/272,012, entitled “BLOCK LEVEL DATASTORAGE SECURITY SYSTEM”, filed 17 Nov. 2008. The present disclosurealso claims the benefit of commonly assigned U.S. patent applicationSer. No. 12/336,558, entitled “DATA RECOVERY USING ERROR STRIPIDENTIFIERS”, filed 17 Dec. 2008.

The present disclosure is related to commonly assigned, and concurrentlyfiled, U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/336,559 entitled “STORAGESECURITY USING CRYPTOGRAPHIC SPLITTING”, filed 17 Dec. 2008. The presentdisclosure is also related to commonly assigned, and concurrently filed,U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/336,562, entitled “STORAGE SECURITYUSING CRYPTOGRAPHIC SPLITTING”, filed 17 Dec. 2008. The presentdisclosure is related to commonly assigned, and concurrently filed, U.S.patent application Ser. No. 12/336,568, entitled “STORAGE SECURITY USINGCRYPTOGRAPHIC SPLITTING”, filed 17 Dec. 2008. These related applicationsare incorporated by reference herein in its entirety as if it is setforth in this application.

TECHNICAL FIELD

The present disclosure relates to data storage systems, and security forsuch systems. In particular, the present disclosure relates to storagesecurity in systems implementing cryptographic splitting.

BACKGROUND

Modern organizations generate and store large quantities of data. Inmany instances, organizations store much of their important data at acentralized data storage system. It is frequently important that suchorganizations be able to quickly access the data stored at the datastorage system. In addition, it is frequently important that data storedat the data storage system be recoverable if the data is written to thedata storage system incorrectly or if portions of the data stored at therepository is corrupted. Furthermore, it is important that data be ableto be backed up to provide security in the event of device failure orother catastrophic event.

The large scale data centers managed by such organizations typicallyrequire mass data storage structures and storage area networks capableof providing both long-term mass data storage and access capabilitiesfor application servers using that data. Some data security measures areusually implemented in such large data storage networks, and areintended to ensure proper data privacy and prevent data corruption.Typically, data security is accomplished via encryption of data and/oraccess control to a network within which the data is stored. Data can bestored in one or more locations, e.g. using a redundant array ofinexpensive disks (RAID) or other techniques.

One example existing mass data storage system 10 is illustrated inFIG. 1. As shown, an application server 12 (e.g. a database or filesystem provider) connects to a number of storage devices 14 ₁-14 _(N)providing mass storage of data to be maintained accessible to theapplication server via direct connection 15, an IP-based network 16, anda Storage Area Network 18. Each of the storage devices 14 can host disks20 of various types and configurations useable to store this data.

The physical disks 20 are made visible/accessible to the applicationserver 12 by mapping those disks to addressable ports using, forexample, logical unit numbering (LUN), internet SCSI (iSCSI), or commoninternet file system (CIFS) connection schemes. In the configurationshown, five disks are made available to the application server 12,bearing assigned letters I-M. Each of the assigned drive letterscorresponds to a different physical disk 20 (or at least a differentportion of a physical disk) connected to a storage device 14, and has adedicated addressable port through which that disk 20 is accessible forstorage and retrieval of data. Therefore, the application server 12directly addresses data stored on the physical disks 20.

A second typical data storage arrangement 30 is shown in FIG. 2. Thearrangement 30 illustrates a typical data backup configuration useableto tape-backup files stored in a data network. The network 30 includesan application server 32, which makes a snapshot of data 34 to send to abackup server 36. The backup server 36 stores the snapshot, and operatesa tape management system 38 to record that snapshot to a magnetic tape40 or other long-term storage device.

These data storage arrangements have a number of disadvantages. Forexample, in the network 10, a number of data access vulnerabilitiesexist. An unauthorized user can steal a physical disk 20, and therebyobtain access to sensitive files stored on that disk. Or, theunauthorized user can exploit network vulnerabilities to observe datastored on disks 20 by monitoring the data passing in any of the networks15, 16, 18 between an authorized application server 12 or otherauthorized user and the physical disk 20. The network 10 also hasinherent data loss risks. In the network 30, physical data storage canbe time consuming, and physical backup tapes can be subject to failure,damage, or theft.

To overcome some of these advantages, systems have been introduced whichduplicate and/or separate files and directories for storage across oneor more physical disks. The files and directories are typically storedor backed up as a monolith, meaning that the files are logically groupedwith other like data before being secured. Although this provides aconvenient arrangement for retrieval, in that a common securityconstruct (e.g. an encryption key or password) is related to all of thedata, it also provides additional risk exposure if the data iscompromised. Furthermore, similar data is typically stored encryptedwith a common encryption key, thereby rendering the data vulnerable ifthe key is obtained.

For these and other reasons, improvements are desirable.

SUMMARY

In accordance with the following disclosure, the above and otherproblems are solved by the following:

In a first aspect, a system for administrative management of a securedata storage network are disclosed. The system includes a secure storageappliance configured to host a plurality of volumes, each volumeassociated with a plurality of shares stored on a correspondingplurality of physical storage devices and having a plurality of volumemanagement settings, wherein each volume is accessible by a group of oneor more users, each user assigned an administrative access level, thevolume management settings are editable by a first user from the groupof one or more users associated with the volume and assigned anadministrative access level sufficient to edit the volume managementsettings, and the volume management settings are inaccessible by asecond user from outside the group of one or more users associated withthe volume and assigned an administrative access level at least equal tothat of the first user.

In a second aspect, a system for administrative management of a securedata storage network is disclosed. The system includes a secure storageappliance configured to host a plurality of volumes, each volumeassociated with a plurality of shares stored on a correspondingplurality of physical storage devices and having a plurality of volumemanagement settings. The system further includes a security groupdefinition designating a plurality of security groups, each securitygroup associated with a volume and assigned to a security administrator,wherein volume management settings of a volume associated with one ofthe plurality of security groups are editable by the securityadministrator associated with the security group.

In a third aspect, a method of accessing administrative settings in asecure storage appliance is disclosed. The method includes receiving arequest for administrative access to a volume managed by the securestorage appliance, the volume associated with a plurality of sharesstored on a plurality of physical storage devices, the request includingan identifier of an administrative user. The method also includeschecking an administrative access level to determine access rights ofthe administrative user. The method further includes responding to therequest for administrative access based on an outcome of checking theadministrative access level and generating a log record of the receivedrequest for administrative access. In the method, the administrativeuser lacks access rights to a second volume different from the volumeassociated with a share stored on the plurality of physical storagedevices.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 illustrates an example prior art network providing data storage;

FIG. 2 illustrates an example prior art network providing data backupcapabilities;

FIG. 3 illustrates a data storage system according to a possibleembodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 4 illustrates a data storage system according to a further possibleembodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 5 illustrates a portion of a data storage system including a securestorage appliance, according to a possible embodiment of the presentdisclosure;

FIG. 6 illustrates a block diagram of logical components of a securestorage appliance, according to a possible embodiment of the presentdisclosure.

FIG. 7 illustrates a portion of a data storage system including a securestorage appliance, according to a further possible embodiment of thepresent disclosure;

FIG. 8 illustrates dataflow of a write operation according to a possibleembodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 9 illustrates dataflow of a read operation according to a possibleembodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 10 illustrates a further possible embodiment of a data storagenetwork including redundant secure storage appliances, according to apossible embodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 11 illustrates incorporation of secure storage appliances in aportion of a data storage network, according to a possible embodiment ofthe present disclosure;

FIG. 12 illustrates an arrangement of a data storage network accordingto a possible embodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 13 illustrates a physical block structure of data to be writtenonto a physical storage device, according to aspects of the presentdisclosure;

FIG. 14 shows a flowchart of systems and methods for providing access tosecure storage in a storage area network according to a possibleembodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 15 shows a flowchart of systems and methods for reading block-levelsecured data according to a possible embodiment of the presentdisclosure;

FIG. 16 shows a flowchart of systems and methods for writing block-levelsecured data according to a possible embodiment of the presentdisclosure;

FIG. 17 shows a possible arrangement for providing secure storage databackup, according to a possible embodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 18 shows a possible arrangement for providing secure storage for athin client computing network, according to a possible embodiment of thepresent disclosure;

FIG. 19 shows a block diagram of aspects of an example connectionbetween a client device and a secure storage appliance, according to apossible embodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 20 shows a flowchart of methods and systems for securing andretrieving data from a physical storage device, according to certainembodiments of the present disclosure;

FIG. 21 shows a flowchart for methods and systems for presenting avirtual disk to a client device, according to a possible embodiment ofthe present disclosure;

FIG. 22 shows a flowchart for methods and systems for replacing aworkgroup key used to secure data stored using a secure storageappliance, according to certain embodiments of the present disclosure;

FIG. 23 shows a flowchart for methods and systems for replacing asession key used to secure data stored using a secure storage appliance,according to certain embodiments of the present disclosure;

FIG. 24 shows a hierarchical arrangement of administrative access rightsuseable in a secure data storage network, according to a possibleembodiment of the present disclosure; and

FIG. 25 shows a flowchart for methods and systems for accessingadministrative settings in a secure storage appliance, according to apossible embodiment of the present disclosure.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Various embodiments of the present invention will be described in detailwith reference to the drawings, wherein like reference numeralsrepresent like parts and assemblies throughout the several views.Reference to various embodiments does not limit the scope of theinvention, which is limited only by the scope of the claims attachedhereto. Additionally, any examples set forth in this specification arenot intended to be limiting and merely set forth some of the manypossible embodiments for the claimed invention.

The logical operations of the various embodiments of the disclosuredescribed herein are implemented as: (1) a sequence of computerimplemented steps, operations, or procedures running on a programmablecircuit within a computer, and/or (2) a sequence of computer implementedsteps, operations, or procedures running on a programmable circuitwithin a directory system, database, or compiler.

In general the present disclosure relates to a storage security for ablock-level data storage system. By block-level, it is intended that thedata storage and security performed according to the present disclosureis not performed based on the size or arrangement of logical files (e.g.on a per-file or per-directory level), but rather that the data securityis based on individual read and write operations related to physicalblocks of data. In various embodiments of the present disclosure, thedata managed by the read and write operations are split or grouped on abitwise or other physical storage level. These physical storage portionsof files can be stored in a number of separated components, andencrypted. The split, encrypted data improves data security for the data“at rest” on the physical disks, regardless of the accessvulnerabilities of physical disks storing the data. This is at least inpart because the data cannot be recognizably reconstituted withouthaving appropriate access and decryption rights to multiple, distributeddisks. The access rights limitations provided by such a system alsomakes deletion of data simple, in that deletion of access rights (e.g.encryption keys) provides for effective deletion of all data related tothose rights.

The storage security elements of the present disclosure provide forselective data presentation to users, as well as distribution ofadministrative roles among a number of administrative users. Thesefeatures prevent concentration of access of data in a single individualor group of individuals, thereby improving overall data security. Thestorage security elements of the present disclosure also encompasssystems for updating security in the systems disclosed herein, such asby updating and replacing encryption keys used to secure data.

The various embodiments of the present disclosure are applicable acrossa number of possible networks and network configurations; in certainembodiments, the block-level data storage security system can beimplemented within a storage area network (SAN) or Network-AttachedStorage (NAS). Other possible networks in which such systems can beimplemented exist as well.

Referring now to FIG. 3, a block diagram illustrating an example datastorage system 100 is shown, according to the principles of the presentdisclosure. In the example of FIG. 3, system 100 includes a set ofclient devices 105A through 105N (collectively, “client devices 105”).Client devices 105 can be a wide variety of different types of devices.For example, client devices 105 can be personal computers, laptopcomputers, network telephones, mobile telephones, television set topboxes, network televisions, video gaming consoles, web kiosks, devicesintegrated into vehicles, mainframe computers, personal media players,intermediate network devices, network appliances, and other types ofcomputing devices. Client devices 105 may or may not be used directly byhuman users.

Client devices 105 are connected to a network 110. Network 110facilitates communication among electronic devices connected to network110. Network 110 can be a wide variety of electronic communicationnetworks. For example, network 110 can be a local-area network, awide-area network (e.g., the Internet), an extranet, or another type ofcommunication network. Network 110 can include a variety of connections,including wired and wireless connections. A variety of communicationsprotocols can be used on network 110 including Ethernet, WiFi, WiMax,Transfer Control Protocol, and many other communications protocols.

In addition, system 100 includes an application server 115. Applicationserver 115 is connected to the network 110, which is able to facilitatecommunication between the client devices 105 and the application server115. The application server 115 provides a service to the client devices105 via network 110. For example, the application server 115 can providea web application to the client devices 105. In another example, theapplication server 115 can provide a network-attached storage server tothe client devices 105. In another example, the application server 115can provide a database access service to the client devices 105. Otherpossibilities exist as well.

The application server 115 can be implemented in several ways. Forexample, the application server 115 can be implemented as a standaloneserver device, as a server blade, as an intermediate network device, asa mainframe computing device, as a network appliance, or as another typeof computing device. Furthermore, it should be appreciated that theapplication server 115 can include a plurality of separate computingdevices that operate like one computing device. For instance, theapplication server 115 can include an array of server blades, a networkdata center, or another set of separate computing devices that operateas if one computing device. In certain instances, the application servercan be a virtualized application server associated with a particulargroup of users, as described in greater detail below in FIG. 18.

The application server 115 is communicatively connected to a securestorage appliance 120 that is integrated in a storage area network (SAN)125. Further, the secure storage appliance 120 is communicativelyconnected to a plurality of storage devices 130A through 130N(collectively, “storage devices 130”). Similar to the secure storageappliance 120, the storage devices 130 can be integrated with the SAN125.

The secure storage appliance 120 can be implemented in several ways. Forexample, the secure storage appliance 120 can be implemented as astandalone server device, as a server blade, as an intermediate networkdevice, as a mainframe computing device, as a network appliance, or asanother type of computing device. Furthermore, it should be appreciatedthat, like the application server 115, the secure storage appliance 120can include a plurality of separate computing devices that operate likeone computing device. In certain embodiments, SAN 125 may include aplurality of secure storage appliances. Each of secure storageappliances 214 is communicatively connected to a plurality of thestorage devices 130. In addition, it should be appreciated that thesecure storage appliance 120 can be implemented on the same physicalcomputing device as the application server 115.

The application server 115 can be communicatively connected to thesecure storage appliance 120 in a variety of ways. For example, theapplication server 115 can be communicatively connected to the securestorage appliance 120 such that the application server 115 explicitlysends I/O commands to secure storage appliance 120. In another example,the application server 115 can be communicatively connected to securestorage appliance 120 such that the secure storage appliance 120transparently intercepts I/O commands sent by the application server115. On a physical level, the application server 115 and the securestorage appliance 120 can be connected via most physical interfaces thatsupport a SCSI command set. For example, Fibre Channel and iSCSIinterfaces could be used.

The storage devices 130 can be implemented in a variety of differentways as well. For example, one or more of the storage devices 130 can beimplemented as disk arrays, tape drives, JBODs (“just a bunch ofdisks”), or other types of electronic data storage devices.

In various embodiments, the SAN 125 is implemented in a variety of ways.For example, the SAN 125 can be a local-area network, a wide-areanetwork (e.g., the Internet), an extranet, or another type of electroniccommunication network. The SAN 125 can include a variety of connections,including wired and wireless connections. A variety of communicationsprotocols can be used on the SAN 125 including Ethernet, WiFi, WiMax,Transfer Control Protocol, and many other communications protocols. Incertain embodiments, the SAN 125 is a high-bandwidth data networkprovided using, at least in part, an optical communication networkemploying Fibre Channel connections and Fibre Channel Protocol (FCP)data communications protocol between ports of data storage computingsystems.

The SAN 125 additionally includes an administrator device 135. Theadministrator device 135 is communicatively connected to the securestorage appliance 120 and optionally to the storage devices 130. Theadministrator device 135 facilitates administrative management of thesecure storage appliance 120 and to storage devices. For example, theadministrator device 135 can provide an application that can transferconfiguration information to the secure storage appliance 120 and thestorage devices 130. In another example, the administrator device 135can provide a directory service used to store information about the SAN125 resources and also centralize the SAN 125.

In various embodiments, the administrator device 135 can be implementedin several ways. For example, the administrator device 135 can beimplemented as a standalone computing device such as a PC or a laptop,or as another type of computing device. Furthermore, it should beappreciated that, like the secure storage appliance 120, theadministrator device 135 can include a plurality of separate computingdevices that operate as one computing device.

Now referring to FIG. 4, a data storage system 200 is shown according toa possible embodiment of the present disclosure. The data storage system200 provides additional security by way of introduction of a securestorage appliance and related infrastructure/functionality into the datastorage system 200, as described in the generalized example of FIG. 3.

In the embodiment shown, the data storage system 200 includes anapplication server 202, upon which a number of files and databases arestored. The application server 202 is generally one or more computingdevices capable of connecting to a communication network and providingdata and/or application services to one or more users (e.g. in aclient-server, thin client, or local account model). The applicationserver 202 is connected to a plurality of storage systems 204. In theembodiment shown, storage systems 204 ₁₋₅ are shown, and are illustratedas a variety of types of systems including direct local storage, as wellas hosted remote storage. Each storage system 204 manages storage on oneor more physical storage devices 206. The physical storage devices 206generally correspond to hard disks or other long-term data storagedevices. In the specific embodiment shown, the JBOD storage system 204 ₁connects to physical storage devices 206 ₁, the NAS storage system 204 ₂connects to physical storage device 206 ₂, the JBOD storage system 204 ₃connects to physical storage devices 206 ₃₋₇, the storage system 204 ₄connects to physical storage devices 206 ₈₋₁₂, and the JBOD storagesystem 204 ₅ connects to physical storage device 206 ₁₃. Otherarrangements are possible as well, and are in general a matter of designchoice.

In the embodiment shown, a plurality of different networks andcommunicative connections reside between the application server 202 andthe storage systems 204. For example, the application server 202 isdirectly connected to storage system 204 ₁ via a JBOD connection 208,e.g. for local storage. The application server 202 is alsocommunicatively connected to storage systems 204 ₂₋₃ via network 210,which uses any of a number of IP-based protocols such as Ethernet, WiFi,WiMax, Transfer Control Protocol, or any other of a number ofcommunications protocols. The application server 202 also connects tostorage systems 204 ₄₋₅ via a storage area network (SAN) 212, which canbe any of a number of types of SAN networks described in conjunctionwith SAN 125, above.

A secure storage appliance 120 is connected between the applicationserver 202 and a plurality of the storage systems 204. The securestorage appliance 120 can connect to dedicated storage systems (e.g. theJBOD storage system 204 ₅ in FIG. 4), or to storage systems connectedboth directly through the SAN 212, and via the secure storage appliance120 (e.g. the JBOD storage system 204 ₃ and storage system 204 ₄).Additionally, the secure storage appliance 120 can connect to systemsconnected via the network 210 (e.g. the JBOD system 204 ₃). Otherarrangements are possible as well. In instances where the secure storageappliance 120 is connected to a storage system 204, one or more of thephysical storage devices 206 managed by the corresponding system issecured by way of data processing by the secure storage appliance. Inthe embodiment shown, the physical storage devices 206 ₃₋₇, 206 ₁₀₋₁₃are secured physical storage devices, meaning that these devices containdata managed by the secure storage appliance 120, as explained infurther detail below.

Generally, inclusion of the secure storage appliance 120 within the datastorage system 200 may provide improved data security for data stored onthe physical storage devices. As is explained below, this can beaccomplished, for example, by cryptographically splitting the data to bestored on the physical devices, such that generally each device containsonly a portion of the data required to reconstruct the originally storeddata, and that portion of the data is a block-level portion of the dataencrypted to prevent reconstitution by unauthorized users.

Through use of the secure storage appliance 120 within the data storagesystem 200, a plurality of physical storage devices 208 can be mapped toa single volume, and that volume can be presented as a virtual disk foruse by one or more groups of users. In comparing the example datastorage system 200 to the prior art system shown in FIG. 1, it can beseen that the secure storage appliance 120 allows a user to have anarrangement other than one-to-one correspondence between drive volumeletters (in FIG. 1, drive letters I-M) and physical storage devices. Inthe embodiment shown, two additional volumes are exposed to theapplication server 202, virtual disk drives T and U, in which securecopies of data can be stored. Virtual disk having volume label T isillustrated as containing secured volumes F3 and F7 (i.e. the drivesmapped to the iSCSI2 port of the application server 202, as well as anew drive), thereby providing a secured copy of information on either ofthose drives for access by a group of users. Virtual disk having volumelabel U provides a secured copy of the data held in DB1 (i.e. the drivemapped to LUN03). By distributing volumes across multiple disks,security is enhanced because copying or stealing data from a singlephysical disk will generally be insufficient to access that data (i.e.multiple disks of data, as well as separately-held encryption keys, mustbe acquired)

Referring now to FIG. 5, a portion of the data storage system 200 isshown, including details of the secure storage appliance 120. In theembodiment shown, the secure storage appliance 120 includes a number offunctional modules that generally allow the secure storage appliance tomap a number of physical disks to one or more separate, accessiblevolumes that can be made available to a client, and presenting a virtualdisk to clients based on those defined volumes. Transparently to theuser, the secure storage appliance applies a number of techniques tostored and retrieved data to provide data security.

In the embodiment shown, the secure storage appliance 120 includes acore functional unit 216, a LUN mapping unit 218, and a storagesubsystem interface 220. The core functional unit 216 includes a dataconversion module 222 that operates on data written to physical storagedevices 206 and retrieved from the physical storage devices 206. Ingeneral, when the data conversion module 222 receives a logical unit ofdata (e.g. a file or directory) to be written to physical storagedevices 206, it splits that primary data block at a physical level (i.e.a “block level”) and encrypts the secondary data blocks using a numberof encryption keys.

The manner of splitting the primary data block, and the number ofphysical blocks produced, is dictated by additional control logic withinthe core functional unit 216. As described in further detail below,during a write operation that writes a primary data block to physicalstorage (e.g. from an application server 202), the core functional unit216 directs the data conversion module 222 to split the primary datablock received from the application server 202 into N separate secondarydata blocks. Each of the N secondary data blocks is intended to bewritten to a different physical storage device 206 within the datastorage system 200. The core functional unit 216 also dictates to thedata conversion module 222 the number of shares (for example, denoted asM of the N total shares) that are required to reconstitute the primarydata block when requested by the application server 202.

The secure storage appliance 120 connects to a metadata store 224, whichis configured to hold metadata information about the locations,redundancy, and encryption of the data stored on the physical storagedevices 206. The metadata store 224 is generally held locally or inproximity to the secure storage appliance 120, to ensure fast access ofmetadata regarding the shares. The metadata store 224 can be, in variousembodiments, a database or file system storage of data describing thedata connections, locations, and shares used by the secure storageappliance. Additional details regarding the specific metadata stored inthe metadata store 224 are described below.

The LUN mapping unit 218 generally provides a mapping of one or morephysical storage devices 206 to a volume. Each volume corresponds to aspecific collection of physical storage devices 206 upon which the datareceived from client devices is stored. In contrast, typical prior artsystems assign a LUN (logical unit number) or other identifier to eachphysical storage device or connection port to such a device, such thatdata read operations and data write operations directed to a storagesystem 204 can be performed specific to a device associated with thesystem. In the embodiment shown, the LUNs correspond to targetaddressable locations on the secure storage appliance 120, of which oneor more is exposed to a client device, such as an application server202. Based on the mapping of LUNs to a volume, the virtual disk relatedto that volume appears as a directly-addressable component of the datastorage system 200, having its own LUN. From the perspective of theapplication server 202, this obscures the fact that primary data blockswritten to a volume can in fact be split, encrypted, and written to aplurality of physical storage devices across one or more storage systems204.

The storage subsystem interface 220 routes data from the core functionalunit 216 to the storage systems 204 communicatively connected to thesecure storage appliance 120. The storage subsystem interface 220 allowsaddressing various types of storage systems 204. Other functionality canbe included as well.

In the embodiment shown, a plurality of LUNs are made available by theLUN mapping unit 218, for addressing by client devices. As shown by wayof example, LUNs LUN04-LUNnn are illustrated as being addressable byclient devices. Within the core functional unit 216, the data conversionmodule 222 associates data written to each LUN with a share of thatdata, split into N shares and encrypted. In the embodiment shown in theexample of FIG. 5, a block read operation or block write operation toLUN04 is illustrated as being associated with a four-way write, in whichsecondary data blocks L04.a through L04.d are created, and mapped tovarious devices connected to output ports, shown in FIG. 5 as networkinterface cards (NICs), a Fibre Channel interface, and a serial ATAinterface. An analogous operation is also shown with respect to LUN05,but written to a different combination of shares and correspondingphysical disks.

The core functional unit 216, LUN mapping unit 218, and storagesubsystem interface 220 can include additional functionality as well,for managing timing and efficiency of data read and write operations.Additional details regarding this functionality are described in anotherembodiment, detailed below in conjunction with the secure storageappliance functionality described in FIG. 6.

The secure storage appliance 120 includes an administration interface226 that allows an administrator to set up components of the securestorage appliance 120 and to otherwise manage data encryption,splitting, and redundancy. The administration interface 226 handlesinitialization and discovery on the secure storage appliance, as well ascreation, modifying, and deletion of individual volumes and virtualdisks; event handling; data base administration; and other systemservices (such as logging). Additional details regarding usage of theadministration interface 226 are described below in conjunction withFIG. 14.

In the embodiment shown of the secure storage appliance 120, the securestorage appliance 120 connects to an optional enterprise directory 228and a key manager 230 via the administration interface 226. Theenterprise directory 228 is generally a central repository forinformation about the state of the secure storage appliance 120, and canbe used to help coordinate use of multiple secure storage appliances ina network, as illustrated in the configuration shown in FIG. 10, below.The enterprise directory 228 can store, in various embodiments,information including a remote user table, a virtual disk table, ametadata table, a device table, log and audit files, administratoraccounts, and other secure storage appliance status information.

In embodiments lacking the enterprise directory 228, redundant securestorage appliances 214 can manage and prevent failures by storing statusinformation of other secure storage appliances, to ensure that eachappliance is aware of the current state of the other appliances.

The key manager 230 stores and manages certain keys used by the datastorage system 200 for encrypting data specific to various physicalstorage locations and various individuals and groups accessing thosedevices. In certain embodiments, the key manager 230 stores workgroupkeys. Each workgroup key relates to a specific community of individuals(i.e. a “community of interest”) and a specific volume, thereby defininga virtual disk for that community. The key manager 230 can also storelocal copies of session keys for access by the secure storage appliance120. Secure storage appliance 120 uses each of the session keys tolocally encrypt data on different ones of physical storage devices 206.Passwords can be stored at the key manager 230 as well. In certainembodiments, the key manager 230 is operable on a computing systemconfigured to execute any of a number of key management softwarepackages, such as the Key Management Service provided for a WindowsServer environment, manufactured by Microsoft Corp. of Redmond, Wash.

Although the present disclosure provides for encryption keys includingsession keys and workgroup keys, additional keys may be used as well,such as a disk signature key, security group key, client key, or othertypes of keys. Each of these keys can be stored on one or more ofphysical storage devices 206, at the secure storage appliance 120, or inthe key manager 230.

Although FIGS. 4-5 illustrate a particular arrangement of a data storagesystem 200 for secure storage of data, additional arrangements arepossible as well that can operate consistently with the concepts of thepresent disclosure. For example, in certain embodiments, the system caninclude a different number or type of storage systems or physicalstorage devices, and can include one or more different types of clientsystems in place of or in addition to the application server 202.Furthermore, the secure storage appliance 120 can be placed in any of anumber of different types of networks, but does not require the presenceof multiple types of networks as illustrated in the example of FIG. 4.

FIG. 6 is a block diagram that illustrates example logical components ofthe secure storage appliance 120. FIG. 6 represents only one example ofthe logical components of the secure storage appliance 120, forperforming the operations described herein. The operations of the securestorage appliance 120 can be conceptualized and implemented in manydifferent ways.

As illustrated in the example of FIG. 6, the secure storage appliance120 comprises a primary interface 300 and a secondary interface 302. Theprimary interface 300 enables secure storage appliance 120 to receiveprimary I/O requests and to send primary I/O responses. For instance,the primary interface 300 can enable secure storage appliance 120 toreceive primary I/O requests (e.g. read and write requests) from theapplication server device 202 and to send primary I/O responses to theapplication server 202. Secondary interface enables the secure storageappliance 120 to send secondary I/O requests to the storage systems 204,and to receive secondary I/O responses from those storage systems 204.

In addition, the secure storage appliance 120 comprises a parser driver304. The parser driver 304 generally corresponds to the data conversionmodule 224 of FIG. 5, in that it processes primary I/O requests togenerate secondary I/O requests and processes secondary I/O responses togenerate primary I/O responses. To accomplish this, the parser driver304 comprises a read module 305 that processes primary read requests togenerate secondary read requests and processes secondary read responsesto generate primary read responses. In addition, the parser driver 304comprises a decryption module 308 that enables the read module 305 toreconstruct a primary data block using secondary blocks contained insecondary read responses. Example operations performed by the readmodule 305 are described below with reference to FIG. 18 and FIG. 21.Furthermore, the parser driver 304 comprises a write module 306 thatprocesses primary write requests to generate secondary write requestsand processes secondary write responses to generate primary writeresponses. The parser driver 304 also comprises an encryption module 310that enables the write module 306 to cryptographically split primarydata blocks in primary write requests into secondary data blocks to putin secondary write requests. An example operation performed by the writemodule 305 is described below as well with reference to FIGS. 19 and 23.

In the example of FIG. 6, the secure storage appliance 120 alsocomprises a cache driver 315. When enabled, the cache driver 315receives primary I/O requests received by the primary interface 300before the primary I/O requests are received by parser driver 304. Whenthe cache driver 315 receives a primary read request to read data at aprimary storage location of a virtual disk, the cache driver 315determines whether a write-through cache 316 at the secure storageappliance 120 contains a primary write request to write a primary datablock to the primary storage location of the virtual disk. If the cachedriver 315 determines that the write-through cache 316 contains aprimary write request to write a primary data block to the primarystorage location of the virtual disk, the cache driver 315 outputs aprimary read response that contains the primary data block. When theparser driver 304 receives a primary write request to write a primarydata block to a primary storage location of a virtual disk, the cachedriver 315 caches the primary write request in the write-through cache316. A write-through module 318 performs write operations to memory fromthe write-through cache 316.

The secure storage appliance 120 also includes an outstanding write list(OWL) module 326. When enabled, the OWL module 326 receives primary I/Orequests from the primary interface 300 before the primary I/O requestsare received by the parser driver 304. The OWL module 326 uses anoutstanding write list 320 to process the primary I/O requests.

In addition, the secure storage appliance 120 comprises a backup module324. The backup module 324 performs an operation that backs up data atthe storage systems 204 to backup devices, as described below inconjunction with FIGS. 17-18.

The secure storage appliance 120 also comprises a configuration changemodule 312. The configuration change module 312 performs an operationthat creates or destroys a volume, and sets its redundancyconfiguration. Example redundancy configurations (i.e. “M of N”configurations) are described throughout the present disclosure, andrefer to the number of shares formed from a block of data, and thenumber of those shares required to reconstitute the block of data.Further discussion is provided with respect to possible redundancyconfigurations below, in conjunction with FIGS. 8-9.

It should be appreciated that many alternate implementations of thesecure storage appliance 120 are possible. For example, a firstalternate implementation of the secure storage appliance 120 can includethe OWL module 326, but not the cache driver 315, or vice versa. Inother examples, the secure storage appliance 120 might not include thebackup module 324 or the configuration change module 312. Furthermore,there can be many alternate operations performed by the various modulesof the secure storage appliance 120.

FIG. 7 illustrates further details regarding connections to andoperational hardware and software included in secure storage appliance120, according to a possible embodiment of the present disclosure. Thesecure storage appliance 120 illustrates the various operationalhardware modules available in the secure storage appliance to accomplishthe data flow and software module operations described in FIGS. 4-6,above. In the embodiment shown, the secure storage appliance 120 iscommunicatively connected to a client device 402, an administrativeconsole 404, a key management server 406, a plurality of storage devices408, and an additional secure storage appliance 120′.

In the embodiment shown, the secure storage appliance 120 connects tothe client device 402 via both an IP network connection 401 and a SANnetwork connection 403. The secure storage appliance 120 connects to theadministrative console 404 by one or more IP connections 405 as well.The key management server 406 is also connected to the secure storageappliance 120 by an IP network connection 407. The storage devices 408are connected to the secure storage appliance 120 by the SAN network403, such as a Fibre Channel or other high-bandwidth data connection.Finally, in the embodiment shown, secure storage appliances 120, 120′are connected via any of a number of types of communicative connections411, such as an IP or other connection, for communicating heartbeatmessages and status information for coordinating actions of the securestorage appliance 120 and the secure storage appliance 120′. Although inthe embodiment shown, these specific connections and systems areincluded, the arrangement of devices connected to the secure storageappliance 120, as well as the types and numbers of devices connected tothe appliance may be different in other embodiments.

The secure storage appliance 120 includes a number of software-basedcomponents, including a management service 410 and a system managementmodule 412. The management service 410 and the system management module412 each connect to the administrative console 404 or otherwise providesystem management functionality for the secure storage appliance 120.The management service 410 and system management module 412 aregenerally used to set various settings in the secure storage appliance120, view logs 414 stored on the appliance, and configure other aspectsof a network including the secure storage appliance 120. Additionally,the management service 410 connects to the key management server 406,and can request and receive keys from the key management server 406 asneeded.

A cluster service 416 provides synchronization of state informationbetween the secure storage appliance 120 and secure storage appliance120′. In certain embodiments, the cluster service 416 manages aheartbeat message and status information exchanged between the securestorage appliance 120 and the secure storage appliance 120′. Securestorage appliance 120 and secure storage appliance 120′ periodicallyexchange heartbeat messages to ensure that secure storage appliance 120and secure storage appliance 120′ maintain contact. Secure storageappliance 120 and secure storage appliance 120′ maintain contact toensure that the state information received by each secure storageappliance indicating the state of the other secure storage appliance isup to date. An active directory services 418 stores the statusinformation, and provides status information periodically to othersecure storage appliances via the connection 412.

Additional hardware and/or software components provide datapathfunctionality to the secure storage appliance 120 to allow receipt ofdata and storage of data at the storage systems 408. In the embodimentshown, the secure storage appliance 120 includes a SNMP connectionmodule 420 that enables secure storage appliance 120 to communicate withclient devices via the IP network connection 401, as well as one or morehigh-bandwidth data connection modules, such as a Fibre Channel inputmodule 422 or SCSI input module 424 for receiving data from the client402 or storage systems 408. Analogous data output modules including aFibre Channel connection module 421 or SCSI connection module 423 canconnect to the storage systems 408 or client 402 via the SAN network 403for output of data.

Additional functional systems within the secure storage appliance 120assist in datapath operations. A SCSI command module 425 parses andforms commands to be sent out or received from the client device 402 andstorage systems 408. A multipath communications module 426 provides ageneralized communications interface for the secure storage appliance120, and a disk volume 428, disk 429, and cache 430 provide local datastorage for the secure storage appliance 120.

Additional functional components can be included in the secure storageappliance 120 as well. In the embodiment shown, a parser driver 304provides data splitting and encryption capabilities for the securestorage appliance 120, as previously explained. A provider 434 includesvolume management information, for creation and destruction of volumes.An events module 436 generates and handles events based on observedoccurrences at the secure storage appliance (e.g. data errors orcommunications errors with other systems).

FIGS. 8-9 provide a top level sense of a dataflow occurring during writeand read operations, respectively, passing through a secure storageappliance, such as the secure storage appliance described above inconjunction with FIGS. 3-7. FIG. 8 illustrates a dataflow of a writeoperation according to a possible embodiment of the present disclosure,while FIG. 9 illustrates dataflow of a read operation. In the writeoperation of FIG. 8, a primary data block 450 is transmitted to a securestorage appliance (e.g. from a client device such as an applicationserver). The secure storage appliance can include a functional block 460to separate the primary data block into N secondary data blocks 470,shown as S-1 through S-N. In certain embodiments, the functional block460 is included in a parser driver, such as parser driver 304, above.The specific number of secondary data blocks can vary in differentnetworks, and can be defined by an administrative user having access tocontrol settings relevant to the secure storage appliance. Each of thesecondary data blocks 470 can be written to separate physical storagedevices. In the read operation of FIG. 9, M secondary data blocks areaccessed from physical storage devices, and provided to the functionalblock 460 (e.g. parser driver 304). The functional block 460 thenperforms an operation inverse to that illustrated in FIG. 8, therebyreconstituting the primary data block 450. The primary data block canthen be provided to the requesting device (e.g. a client device).

In each of FIGS. 8-9, the N secondary data blocks 470 each represent acryptographically split portion of the primary data block 450, such thatthe functionality 460 requires only M of the N secondary data blocks(where M<=N) to reconstitute the primary data block 450. Thecryptographic splitting and data reconstitution of FIGS. 8-9 can beperformed according to any of a number of techniques. In one embodimentthe parser driver 304 executes SecureParser software provided bySecurity First Corporation of Rancho Santa Margarita, Calif.

Although, in the embodiment shown in FIG. 9, the parser driver 304 usesthe N secondary data blocks 470 to reconstitute the primary data block450, it is understood that in certain applications, fewer than all ofthe N secondary data blocks 470 are required. For example, when theparser driver 304 generates N secondary data blocks during a writeoperation such that only M secondary data blocks are required toreconstitute the primary data block (where M<N), then data conversionmodule 60 only needs to read that subset of secondary data block fromphysical storage devices to reconstitute the primary data block 450.

For example, during operation of the parser driver 304 a data conversionroutine may generate four secondary data blocks 470, of which two areneeded to reconstitute a primary data block (i.e. M=2, N=4). In such aninstance, two of the secondary data blocks 470 may be stored locally,and two of the secondary data blocks 470 may be stored remotely toensure that, upon failure of a device or catastrophic event at onelocation, the primary data block 450 can be recovered by accessing oneor both of the secondary data blocks 470 stored remotely. Otherarrangements are possible as well, such as one in which four secondarydata blocks 470 are stored locally and all are required to reconstitutethe primary data block 450 (i.e. M=4, N=4). At its simplest, a singleshare could be created (M=N=1).

In certain embodiments, the parser driver whose operation is describedin FIGS. 8-9 can operate on other data as well. For example, the parserdriver 304 can be used to split and encrypt (or conversely decrypt andreconstitute) one or more session keys that are used to secure data onthe various shares. In such embodiments, operation is analogous to thatdescribed above.

FIG. 10 illustrates a further possible embodiment of a data storagesystem 250, according to a possible embodiment of the presentdisclosure. The data storage system 250 generally corresponds to thedata storage system 200 of FIG. 4, above, but further includes redundantsecure storage appliances 214. Each of secure storage appliances 214 maybe an instance of secure storage appliance 120. Inclusion of redundantsecure storage appliances 214 allows for load balancing of read andwrite requests in the data storage system 250, such that a single securestorage appliance is not required to process every secure primary readcommand or primary write command passed from the application server 202to one of the secure storage appliance 214. Use of redundant securestorage appliances also allows for failsafe operation of the datastorage system 250, by ensuring that requests made of a failed securestorage appliance are rerouted to alternative secure storage appliances.

In the embodiment of the data storage system 250 shown, two securestorage appliances 214 are shown. Each of the secure storage appliances214 can be connected to any of a number of clients (e.g. the applicationserver 202), as well as secured storage systems 204, the metadata store224, and a remote server 252. In various embodiments, the remote server252 could be, for example, an enterprise directory 228 and/or a keymanager 230.

The secure storage appliances 214 are also typically connected to eachother via a network connection. In the embodiment shown in the exampleof FIG. 10, the secure storage appliances 214 reside within a network254. In various embodiments, network 254 can be, for example, anIP-based network, SAN as previously described in conjunction with FIGS.4-5, or another type of network. In certain embodiments, the network 254can include aspects of one or both types of networks. An example of aparticular configuration of such a network is described below inconjunction with FIGS. 11-12.

The secure storage appliances 214 in the data storage system 250 areconnected to each other across a TCP/IP portion of the network 254. Thisallows for the sharing of configuration data, and the monitoring ofstate, between the secure storage appliances 214. In certain embodimentsthere can be two IP-based networks, one for sharing of heartbeatinformation for resiliency, and a second for configuration andadministrative use. The secure storage appliance 120 can alsopotentially be able to access the storage systems 204, including remotestorage systems, across an IP network using a data interface.

In operation, sharing of configuration data, state data, and heartbeatinformation between the secure storage appliances 214 allows the securestorage appliances 214 to monitor and determine whether other securestorage appliances are present within the data storage system 250. Eachof the secure storage appliances 214 can be assigned specific addressesof read operations and write operations to process. Secure storageappliances 214 can reroute received I/O commands to the appropriate oneof the secure storage appliances 214 assigned that operation based uponthe availability of that secure storage appliance and the resourcesavailable to the appliance. Furthermore, the secure storage appliances214 can avoid addressing a common storage device 204 or applicationserver 202 port at the same time, thereby avoiding conflicts. The securestorage appliances 214 also avoid reading from and writing to the sameshare concurrently to prevent the possibility of reading stale data.

When one of the secure storage appliances 214 fails, a second securestorage appliance can determine the state of the failed secure storageappliance based upon tracked configuration data (e.g. data trackedlocally or stored at the remote server 252). The remaining operationalone of the secure storage appliance 214 can also access information inthe metadata store 224, including share and key information definingvolumes, virtual disks and client access rights, to either process orreroute requests assigned to the failed device.

As previously described, the data storage system 250 is intended to beexemplary of a possible network in which aspects of the presentdisclosure can be implemented; other arrangements are possible as well,using different types of networks, systems, storage devices, and othercomponents.

Referring now to FIG. 11, one possibility of a methodology ofincorporating secure storage appliances into a data storage network,such as a SAN, is shown according to a possible embodiment of thepresent disclosure. In the embodiment shown, a secure storage network500 provides for fully redundant storage, in that each of the storagesystems connected at a client side of the network is replicated in massstorage, and each component of the network (switches, secure storageappliances) is located in a redundant array of systems, therebyproviding a failsafe in case of component failure. In alternativeembodiments, the secure storage network 500 can be simplified byincluding only a single switch and/or single secure storage appliance,thereby reducing the cost and complexity of the network (whilecoincidentally reducing the protection from component failure).

In the embodiment shown, an overall secure storage network 500 includesa plurality of data lines 502 a-d interconnected by switches 504 a-b.Data lines 502 a-b connect to storage systems 506 a-c, which connect tophysical storage disks 508 a-f. The storage systems 506 a-c correspondgenerally to smaller-scale storage servers, such as an applicationserver, client device, or other system as previously described. In theembodiment shown in the example of FIG. 11, storage system 506 aconnects to physical storage disks 508 a-b, storage system 506 bconnects to physical storage disks 508 c-d, and storage system 506 cconnects to physical storage disks 508 e-f. The secure storage network500 can be implemented in a number of different ways, such as throughuse of Fibre Channel or iSCSI communications as the data lines 502 a-d,ports, and other data communications channels. Other high bandwidthcommunicative connections can be used as well.

The switches 504 a-b connect to a large-scale storage system, such asthe mass storage 510 via the data lines 502 c-d. The mass storage 510includes, in the embodiment shown, two data directors 512 a-b, whichrespectively direct data storage and requests for data to one or more ofthe back end physical storage devices 514 a-d. In the embodiment shown,the physical storage devices 514 a-c are unsecured (i.e. notcryptographically split and encrypted), while the physical storagedevice 514 d stores secure data (i.e. password secured or otherarrangement).

The secure storage appliances 516 a-b also connect to the data lines 502a-d, and each connect to the secure physical storage devices 518 a-e.Additionally, the secure storage appliances 516 a-b connect to thephysical storage devices 520 a-c, which can reside at a remote storagelocation (e.g. the location of the large-scale storage system 510).

In certain embodiments providing redundant storage locations, thenetwork 500 allows a user to configure the secure storage appliances 516a-b such that, using the M of N cryptographic splitting enabled in eachof the secure storage devices 516 a-b, M shares of data can be stored onphysical storage devices at a local location to provide fast retrievalof data, while another M shares of data can be stored on remote physicalstorage devices at a remote location. Therefore, failure of one or morephysical disks or secure storage devices does not render dataunrecoverable, because a sufficient number of shares of data remainaccessible to at least one secure storage device capable ofreconstituting requested data.

FIG. 12 illustrates a particular cluster-based arrangement of a datastorage network 600 according to a possible embodiment of the presentdisclosure. The data storage network 600 is generally arranged such thatclustered secure storage appliances access and store shares on clusteredphysical storage devices, thereby ensuring fast local storage and accessto the cryptographically split data. The data storage network 600 istherefore a particular arrangement of the networks and systems describedabove in FIGS. 1-11, in that it represents an arrangement in whichphysical proximity of devices is accounted for.

In the embodiment shown, the data storage network 600 includes twoclusters, 602 a-b. Each of the clusters 602 a-b includes a pair ofsecure storage appliances 604 a-b, respectively. In the embodimentshown, the clusters 602 a-b are labeled as clusters A and B,respectively, with each cluster including two secure storage appliances604 a-b (shown as appliances A1 and A2 in cluster 602 a, and appliancesB1 and B2 in cluster 602 b, respectively). The secure storage appliances604 a-b within each of the clusters 602 a-b are connected via a datanetwork 605 (e.g. via switches or other data connections in an iSCSI,Fibre Channel, or other data network, as described above and indicatedvia the nodes and connecting lines shown within the network 605) to aplurality of physical storage devices 610. Additionally, the securestorage appliances 604 a-b are connected to client devices 612, shown asclient devices C1-C3, via the data storage network 605. The clientdevices 612 can be any of a number of types of devices, such asapplication servers, database servers, or other types of data-storingand managing client devices.

In the embodiment shown, the client devices 612 are connected to thesecure storage appliances 604 a-b such that each of client devices 612can send I/O operations (e.g. a read request or a write request) to twoor more of the secure storage appliances 604 a-b, to ensure a backupdatapath in case of a connection failure to one of secure storageappliances 604 a-b. Likewise, the secure storage appliances 604 a-b ofeach of clusters 602 a-b are both connected to a common set of physicalstorage devices 610. Although not shown in the example of FIG. 12, thephysical storage devices 610 can be, in certain embodiments, managed byseparate storage systems, as described above. Such storage systems areremoved from the illustration of the network 600 for simplicity, but canbe present in practice.

An administrative system 614 connects to a maintenance console 616 via alocal area network 618. Maintenance console 616 has access to a secureddomain 620 of an IP-based network 622. The maintenance console 616 usesthe secured domain 620 to access and configure the secure storageappliances 604 a-b. One method of configuring the secure storageappliances is described below in conjunction with FIG. 14.

The maintenance console 616 is also connected to both the client devices612 and the physical storage devices 610 via the IP-based network 622.The maintenance console 616 can determine the status of each of thesedevices to determine whether connectivity issues exist, or whether thedevice itself has become non-responsive.

Referring now to FIG. 13, an example physical block structure of datawritten onto one or more physical storage devices is shown, according toaspects of the present disclosure. The example of FIG. 13 illustratesthree strips 700A, 700B, and 700C (collectively, “shares 700”). Each ofstrips 700 is a share of a physical storage device devoted to storingdata associated with a common volume. For example, in a system in whicha write operation splits a primary data block into three secondary datablocks (i.e. N=3), the shares 700 would be appropriately used to storeeach of the secondary data blocks. As used in this disclosure, a volumeis grouped storage that is presented by a secure storage appliance toclients of secure storage appliance (e.g. secure storage appliance 120or 214 as previously described), such that the storage appears as acontiguous, unitary storage location. Secondary data blocks of a volumeare distributed among strips 700. In systems implementing a differentnumber of shares (e.g. N=2, 4, 6, etc.), a different, correspondingnumber of shares would be used. As basic as a 1 of 1 configuration (M=1,N=1) configuration could be used.

Each of the strips 700 corresponds to a reserved portion of memory of adifferent one of physical storage devices (e.g. physical storage devices206 previously described), and relates to a particular I/O operationfrom storage or reading of data to/from the physical storage device.Typically, each of the strips 700 resides on a different one of physicalstorage devices. Furthermore, although three different strips are shownin the illustrative embodiment shown, more or fewer strips can be usedas well. In certain embodiments, each of the strips 700 begins on asector boundary. In other arrangements, the each of the strips 700 canbegin at any other memory location convenient for management within theshare.

Each of strips 700 includes a share label 704, a signature 706, headerinformation 708, virtual disk information 710, and data blocks 712. Theshare label 704 is written on each of strips 700 in plain text, andidentifies the volume and individual share. The share labels 704 canalso, in certain embodiments, contain information describing otherheader information for the strips 700, as well as the origin of the datawritten to the strip (e.g. the originating cluster).

The signatures 706 contain information required to construct the volume,and is encrypted by a workgroup key. The signatures 706 containinformation that can be used to identify the physical device upon whichdata (i.e. the share) is stored. The workgroup key corresponds to a keyassociated with a group of one or more users having a common set ofusage rights with respect to data (i.e. all users within the group canhave access to common data.) In various embodiments, the workgroup keycan be assigned to a corporate department using common data, a commongroup of one or more users, or some other community of interest for whomcommon access rights are desired.

The header information 708 contains session keys used to encrypt anddecrypt the volume information included in the virtual disk information710, described below. The header information 708 is also encrypted bythe workgroup key. In certain embodiments, the header information 708includes headers per section of data. For example, the headerinformation 708 may include one header for each 64 GB of data. In suchembodiments, it may be advantageous to include at least one empty headerlocation to allow re-keying of the data encrypted with a preexistingsession key, using a new session key. Example methods of re-keying aredescribed below in conjunction with FIGS. 22-23.

The virtual disk information 710 includes metadata that describes avirtual disk, as it is presented by a secure storage appliance. Thevirtual disk information 710, in certain embodiments, includes names topresent the virtual disk, a volume security descriptor, and securitygroup information. The virtual disk information 710 can be, in certainembodiments, encrypted by a session key associated with the physicalstorage device upon which the strips 700 are stored, respectively.

The secondary data blocks 712 correspond to a series of memory locationsused to contain the cryptographically split and encrypted data. Each ofthe secondary data blocks 712 contains data created at a secure storageappliance, followed by metadata created by the secure storage applianceas well. The N secondary data blocks created from a primary data blockare combined to form a stripe 714 of data. The metadata stored alongsideeach of the secondary data blocks 712 contains an indicator of theheader used for encrypting the data. In one example implementation, eachof the secondary data blocks 712 includes metadata that specifies anumber of times that the secondary data block has been written. A volumeidentifier and stripe location of an primary data block an be stored aswell.

It is noted that, although a session key is associated with a volume,multiple session keys can be used per volume. For example, a volume mayinclude one session key per 64 GB block of data. In this example, each64 GB block of data contains an identifier of the session key to use indecrypting that 64 GB block of data. The session keys used to encryptdata in each strip 700 can be of any of a number of forms. In certainembodiments, the session keys use an AES-256 Counter with Bit Splitting.In other embodiments, it may be possible to perform bit splittingwithout encryption. Therefore, alongside each secondary data block 712,an indicator of the session key used to encrypt the data block may beprovided.

A variety of access request prioritization algorithms can be includedfor use with the volume, to allow access of only quickest-respondingphysical storage devices associated with the volume. Status informationcan be stored in association with a volume and/or share as well, withchanges in status logged based on detection of event occurrences. Thestatus log can be located in a reserved, dedication portion of memory ofa volume. Other arrangements are possible as well.

It is noted that, based on the encryption of session keys with workgroupkeys and the encryption of the secondary data blocks 712 in each strip700 with session keys, it is possible to effectively delete all of thedata on a disk or volume (i.e. render the data useless) by deleting allworkgroup keys that could decrypt a session key for that disk or volume.Therefore, alongside each secondary data block 712, an indicator of thesession key used to encrypt the data block may be provided.

In certain embodiments, each of the session keys can be, instead ofencrypted as whole entities using a workgroup key and stored in a headerof the shares 700, cryptographically split and encrypted with theworkgroup key as well. In such embodiments, the session keys can besplit such that fewer than all portions of a split, encrypted sessionkey may be required to reconstitute a session key, in a manner analogousto that of the data blocks described herein.

Referring now to FIGS. 14-16, basic example flowcharts of setup and useof the networks and systems disclosed herein are described. Althoughthese flowcharts are intended as example methods for administrative andI/O operations, such operations can include additional steps/modules,can be performed in a different order, and can be associated withdifferent number and operation of modules. In certain embodiments, thevarious modules can be executed concurrently.

FIG. 14 shows a flowchart of systems and methods 800 for providingaccess to secure storage in a storage area network according to apossible embodiment of the present disclosure. The methods and systems800 correspond to a setup arrangement for a network including a securedata storage system such as those described herein, including one ormore secure storage appliances. The embodiments of the methods andsystems described herein can be performed by an administrative user oradministrative software associated with a secure storage appliance, asdescribed herein.

Operational flow is instantiated at a start operation 802, whichcorresponds to initial introduction of a secure storage appliance into anetwork by an administrator or other individuals of such a network in aSAN, NAS, or other type of networked data storage environmentOperational flow proceeds to a client definition module 804 that definesconnections to client devices (i.e. application servers or otherfront-end servers, clients, or other devices) from the secure storageappliance. For example, the client definition module 804 can correspondto mapping connections in a SAN or other network between a client suchas application server 202 and a secure storage appliance 120 of FIG. 4.

Operational flow proceeds to a storage definition module 806. Thestorage definition module 806 allows an administrator to defineconnections to storage systems and related physical storage devices. Forexample, the storage definition module 806 can correspond to discoveringports and routes to storage devices 204 within the system 200 of FIG. 4,above.

Operational flow proceeds to a volume definition module 808. The volumedefinition module 808 defines available volumes by grouping physicalstorage into logical arrangements for storage of shares of data. Forexample, an administrator can create a volume, and assign a number ofattributes to that volume. A storage volume consists of multiple sharesor segments of storage from the same or different locations. Theadministrator can determine a number of shares into which data iscryptographically split, and the number of shares required toreconstitute that data. The administrator can then assign specificphysical storage devices to the volume, such that each of the N sharesis stored on particular devices. The volume definition module 808 cangenerate session keys for storing data on each of the physical storagedevices, and store that information in a key server and/or on thephysical storage devices. In certain embodiments, the session keysgenerated in the volume definition module 808 are stored both on a keyserver connected to the secure storage appliance and on the associatedphysical storage device (e.g. after being encrypted with an appropriateworkgroup key generated by the communities of interest module 810,below). Optionally, the volume definition module 808 includes acapability of configuring preferences for which shares are firstaccessed upon receipt of a request to read data from those shares.

Operational flow proceeds to a communities of interest module 810. Thecommunities of interest module 810 corresponds to creation of one ormore groups of individuals having interest in data to be stored on aparticular volume. The communities of interest 810 module furthercorresponds to assigning of access rights and visibility to volumes toone or more of those groups.

In creating the groups via the communities of interest module 810, oneor more workgroup keys may be created, with each community of interestbeing associated with one or more workgroup keys. The workgroup keys areused to encrypt access information (e.g. the session keys stored onvolumes created during operation of the volume definition module 810)related to shares, to ensure that only individuals and devices fromwithin the community of interest can view and access data associatedwith that group. Once the community of interest is created andassociated with a volume, client devices identified as part of thecommunity of interest can be provided with a virtual disk, which ispresented to the client device as if it is a single, unitary volume uponwhich files can be stored.

In use, the virtual disks appear as physical disks to the client andsupport SCSI or other data storage commands. Bach virtual disk isassociated on a many-to-one basis with a volume, thereby allowingmultiple communities of interest to view common data on a volume (e.g.by replicating the relevant session keys and encrypting those keys withrelevant workgroup keys of the various communities of interest). A writecommand will cause the data to be encrypted and split among multipleshares of the volume before writing, while a read command will cause thedata to be retrieved from the shares, combined, and decrypted.

Operational flow terminates at end operation 812, which corresponds tocompletion of the basic required setup tasks to allow usage of a securedata storage system.

FIG. 15 shows a flowchart of systems and methods 820 for readingblock-level secured data according to a possible embodiment of thepresent disclosure. The methods and systems 820 correspond to a read orinput command related to data stored via a secure storage appliance,such as those described herein. Operational flow in the system 820begins at a start operation 822. Operational flow proceeds to a receiveread request module 824, which corresponds to receipt of a primary readrequest at a secure storage appliance from a client device (e.g. anapplication server or other client device, as illustrated in FIGS. 3-4).The read request generally includes an identifier of a virtual disk fromwhich data is to be read, as well as an identifier of the requesteddata.

Operational flow proceeds to an identity determination module 826, whichcorresponds to a determination of the identity of the client from whichthe read request is received. The client's identity generallycorresponds with a specific community of interest. This assumes that theclient's identity for which the secure storage appliance will access aworkgroup key associated with the virtual disk that is associated withthe client.

Operational flow proceeds to a share determination module 828. The sharedetermination module 828 determines which shares correspond with avolume that is accessed by way of the virtual disk presented to the userand with which the read request is associated. The shares correspond toat least a minimum number of shares needed to reconstitute the primarydata block (i.e. at least M of the N shares). In operation, a readmodule 830 issues secondary read requests to the M shares, and receivesin return the secondary data blocks stored on the associated physicalstorage devices.

A success operation 832 determines whether the read module 830successfully read the secondary data blocks. The success operation maydetect for example, that data has been corrupted, or that a physicalstorage device holding one of the M requested shares has failed, orother errors. If the read is successful, operational flow branches “yes”to a reconstitute data module 834. The reconstitute data module 834decrypts a session key associated with each share with the workgroup keyaccessed by the identity determination module 826. The reconstitute datamodule 834 provides the session key and the encrypted andcryptographically split data to a data processing system within thesecure storage appliance, which reconstitutes the requested data in theform of an unencrypted block of data physical disk locations inaccordance with the principles described above in FIGS. 8-9 and 13. Aprovide data module 836 sends the reconstituted block of data to therequesting client device. A metadata update module 838 updates metadataassociated with the shares, including, for example, access informationrelated to the shares. From the metadata update module 838, operationalflow proceeds to an end operation 840, signifying completion of the readrequest.

If the success operation 832 determines that not all of the M shares aresuccessfully read, operational flow proceeds to a supplemental readoperation 842, which determines whether an additional share exists fromwhich to read data. If such a share exists (e.g. M<N), then thesupplemental read operation reads that data, and operational flowreturns to the success operation 832 to determine whether the system hasnow successfully read at least M shares and can reconstitute the primarydata block as requested. If the supplemental read operation 842determines that no further blocks of data are available to be read (e.g.M=N or M+failed reads>N), operational flow proceeds to a fail module844, which returns a failed read response to the requesting clientdevice. Operational flow proceeds to the update metadata module 838 andend operation 840, respectively, signifying completion of the readrequest.

Optionally, the fail module 844 can correspond to a failover event inwhich a backup copy of the data (e.g. a second N shares of data storedremotely from the first N shares) are accessed. In such an instance,once those shares are tested and failed, a fail message is sent to aclient device.

In certain embodiments, commands and data blocks transmitted to theclient is device can be protected or encrypted, such as by using apublic/private key or symmetric key encryption techniques, or byisolating the data channel between the secure storage appliance andclient. Other possibilities exist for protecting data passing betweenthe client and secure storage appliance as well.

Furthermore, although the system 820 of FIG. 15 illustrates a basic readoperation, it is understood that certain additional cases related toread errors, communications errors, or other anomalies may occur whichcan alter the flow of processing a read operation. For example,additional considerations may apply regarding which M of the N shares toread from upon initially accessing physical storage disks 206. Similarconsiderations apply with respect to subsequent secondary read requeststo the physical storage devices in case those read requests fail aswell.

FIG. 16 shows a flowchart of systems and methods 850 for writingblock-level secured data according to a possible embodiment of thepresent disclosure. The systems and methods 850 as disclosed provide abasic example of a write operation, and similarly to the read operationof FIG. 15 additional cases and different operational flow may be used.

In the example systems and methods 850 disclosed, operational flow isinstantiated at a start operation 852. Operational flow proceeds to awrite request receipt module 854, which corresponds to receiving aprimary write request from a client device (e.g. an application serveras shown in FIGS. 3-4) at a secure storage appliance. The primary writerequest generally addresses a virtual disk, and includes a block of datato be written to the virtual disk.

Operational flow proceeds to an identity determination module 856, whichdetermines the identity of the client device from which the primarywrite request is received. After determining the identity of the clientdevice, the identity determination module 856 accesses a workgroup keybased upon the identity of the client device and accesses the virtualdisk at which the primary write request is targeted. Operational flowproceeds to a share determination module 858, which determines thenumber of secondary data blocks that will be created, and the specificphysical disks on which those shares will be stored. The sharedetermination module 858 obtains the session keys for each of the sharesthat are encrypted with the workgroup key obtained in the identitydetermination module 856 (e.g. locally, from a key manager, or from thephysical disks themselves). These session keys for each share aredecrypted using the workgroup key.

Operational flow proceeds to a data processing module 860, whichprovides to the parser driver 304 the share information, session keys,and the primary data block. The parser driver 304 operates tocryptographically split and encrypt the primary data block, therebygenerating N secondary data blocks to be written to N shares accordancewith the principles described above in the examples of FIGS. 8-9 and 13.Operational flow proceeds to a secondary write module 862 whichtransmits the share information to the physical storage devices forstorage.

Operational flow proceeds to a metadata storage module 864, whichupdates a metadata repository by logging the data written, allowing thesecure storage appliance to track the physical disks upon which data hasbeen written, and with what session and workgroup keys the data can beaccessed. Operational flow terminates at an end operation 866, whichsignifies completion of the write request.

As previously mentioned, in certain instances additional operations canbe included in the system 850 for writing data using the secure storageappliance. For example, confirmation messages can be returned to thesecure storage appliance confirming successful storage of data on thephysical disks. Other operations are possible as well.

Now referring to FIGS. 17-18 of the present disclosure, certainapplications of the present disclosure are discussed in the context of(1) data backup systems and (2) secure network thin client networktopology used in the business setting. FIG. 17 shows an example system900 for providing secure storage data backup, according to a possibleembodiment of the present disclosure. In the system 900 shown, a virtualtape server 902 is connected to a secure storage appliance 904 via adata path 906, such as a SAN network using Fibre Channel or iSCSIcommunications. The virtual tape server 902 includes a management system908, a backup subsystem interface 910, and a physical tape interface912. The management system 908 provides an administrative interface forperforming backup operations. The backup subsystem interface 910receives data to be backed up onto tape, and logs backup operations. Aphysical tape interface 912 queues and coordinates transmission of datato be backed up to the secure storage appliance 904 via the network. Thevirtual tape server 902 is also connected to a virtual tape managementdatabase 914 that stores data regarding historical tape backupoperations performed using the system 900.

The secure storage appliance 904 provides a virtual tape head assembly916 which is analogous to a virtual disk but appears to the virtual tapeserver 902 to be a tape head assembly to be addressed and written to.The secure storage appliance 904 connects to a plurality of tape headdevices 918 capable of writing to magnetic tape, such as that typicallyused for data backup. The secure storage appliance 904 is configured asdescribed above. The virtual tape head assembly 916 provides aninterface to address data to be backed up, which is thencryptographically split and encrypted by the secure storage applianceand stored onto a plurality of distributed magnetic tapes using the tapehead devices 918 (as opposed to a generalized physical storage device,such as the storage devices of FIGS. 3-4).

In use, a network administrator could allocate virtual disks that wouldbe presented to the virtual tape head assembly 916. The virtual tapeadministrator would allocate these disks for storage of data receivedfrom the client through the virtual tape server 902. As data is writtento the disks, it would be cryptographically split and encrypted via thesecure storage appliance 904.

The virtual tape administrator would present virtual tapes to a network(e.g. an IP or data network) from the virtual tape server 902. The datain storage on the tape head devices 918 is saved by the backup functionsprovided by the secure storage appliance 904. These tapes are mapped tothe virtual tapes presented by the virtual tape assembly 916.Information is saved on tapes as a collection of shares, as previouslydescribed.

An example of a tape backup configuration illustrates certain advantagesof a virtual tape server over the standard tape backup system asdescribed above in conjunction with FIG. 2. In one example of a tapebackup configuration, share 1 of virtual disk A, share 1 of virtual diskB, and other share 1's can be saved to a tape using the tape headdevices 918. Second shares of each of these virtual disks could bestored to a different tape. Keeping the shares of a virtual tapeseparate preserves the security of the information, by distributing thatinformation across multiple tapes. This is because more than one tape isrequired to reconstitute data in the case of a data restoration. Datafor a volume is restored by restoring the appropriate shares from therespective tapes. In certain embodiments an interface that canautomatically restore the shares for a volume can be provided for thevirtual tape assembly. Other advantages exist as well.

Now referring to FIG. 18, one possible arrangement of a thin clientnetwork topology is shown in which secure storage is provided. In thenetwork 950 illustrated, a plurality of thin client devices 952 areconnected to a consolidated application server 954 via a secured networkconnection 956.

The consolidated application server 954 provides application and datahosting capabilities for the thin client devices 952. In addition, theconsolidated application server 954 can, as in the example embodimentshown, provide specific subsets of data, functionality, and connectivityfor different groups of individuals within an organization. In theexample embodiment shown, the consolidated application server 954 canconnect to separate networks and can include separate, dedicated networkconnections for payroll, human resources, and finance departments. Otherdepartments could have separate dedicated communication resources, data,and applications as well. The consolidated application server 954 alsoincludes virtualization technology 958, which is configured to assist inmanaging separation of the various departnents' data and applicationaccessibility.

The secured network connection 956 is shown as a secure Ethernetconnection using network interface cards 957 to provide networkconnectivity at the server 954. However, any of a number of secure datanetworks could be implemented as well.

The consolidated application server 954 is connected to a secure storageappliance 960 via a plurality of host bus adapter connections 961. Thesecure storage appliance 960 is generally arranged as previouslydescribed in FIGS. 3-16. The host bus adapter connections 961 allowconnection via a SAN or other data network, such that each of thededicated groups on the consolidated application server 954 has adedicated data connection to the secure storage appliance 960, andseparately maps to different port logical unit numbers (LUNs). Thesecure storage appliance 960 then maps to a plurality of physicalstorage devices 962 that are either directly connected to the securestorage appliance 960 or connected to the secure storage appliance 960via a SAN 964 or other data network.

In the embodiment shown, the consolidated application server 954 hosts aplurality of guest operating systems 955, shown as operating systems 955a-c. The guest operating systems 955 host user-group-specificapplications and data for each of the groups of individuals accessingthe consolidated application server. Each of the guest operating systems955 a-c have virtual LUNs and virtual NIC addresses mapped to the LUNsand NIC addresses within the server 954, while virtualization technology958 provides a register of the mappings of LUNS and NIC addresses of theserver 954 to the virtual LUNs and virtual NIC addresses of the guestoperating systems 955 a-c. Through this arrangement, dedicated guestoperating systems 955 can be mapped to dedicated LUN and NIC addresses,while having data that is isolated from that of other groups, but sharedacross common physical storage devices 962.

As illustrated in the example of FIG. 18, the physical storage devices962 provide a typical logistical arrangement of storage, in which a fewstorage devices are local to the secure storage appliance, while a fewof the other storage devices are remote from the secure storageappliance 960. Through use of (1) virtual disks that are presented tothe various departments accessing the consolidated application server954 and (2) shares of virtual disks assigned to local and remotestorage, each department can have its own data securely stored across aplurality of locations with minimal hardware redundancy and improvedsecurity.

Although FIGS. 17-18 present a few options for applications of thesecure storage appliance and secure network storage of data as describedin the present disclosure, it is understood that further applicationsare possible as well. Furthermore, although each of these applicationsis described in conjunction with a particular network topology, it isunderstood that a variety of network topologies could be implemented toprovide similar functionality, in a manner consistent with theprinciples described herein.

Now referring to FIGS. 19-25, additional details regarding security ofdata stored using the systems and methods described above are provided.FIGS. 19-21 describe presentation of specific data to client devices(e.g. application servers or other devices), while FIGS. 22-23 describekey management in the context of the above systems. FIGS. 24-25illustrates various administrative roles and methods of regulatingadministrative access rights, as provided in the systems and networks ofthe present disclosure.

FIG. 19 shows a block diagram of aspects of an example connectionbetween a client device and a secure storage appliance, according to apossible embodiment of the present disclosure. The block diagramillustrates a portion 1000 of a network in which secure communication isrequired. In the embodiment shown, the portion 1000 of a network isdisclosed which includes a client device 1002 and a secure storageappliance 1004; however it is understood that the portion 1000 can beincluded in (or is embodied in) the various client-secure storageappliance connections previously described.

The client device 1002 includes a connection module 1006, whichprovides, when installed at a client, client-side authenticationsoftware systems for communicating with the secure storage appliance1004.

The connection module 1006 establishes a secure connection withmanagement services on the secure storage appliance 1004 using eitherKerberos or certificate-based authentication. In embodiments usingKerberos authentication, the client device 1002 may be located within atrusted domain (e.g. a common domain with the secure storage applianceor another trusted domain). The connection module 1006 can, in suchinstances, use a remote procedure call or other method to communicatewith the secure storage appliance 1004. Alternatively, a secure socketlayer may be used in conjunction with certificate-based authentication.

In certain embodiments, the connection module 1006 can transmit theauthentication information to the secure storage appliance 1004 througha proxy (not shown). The proxy can relay requests transmitted betweenthe client device 1002 and secure storage appliance 1004.

The connection module 1006 passes identifying information about theclient device to the secure storage appliance for verification, andexchanges encryption keys (e.g. public keys of a public/private keypair) used for encryption of messages passed between the client andsecure storage appliance. In certain embodiments, the identifyinginformation includes the name of the client device, as well as anidentifier of a host bus adapter on the client device (i.e. the worldwide name of the host bus adapter). The connection module 1006 alsoreceives configuration information, and can perform inquiries on virtualdisks presented to it by the secure storage appliance 1004.

A server connection module 1008 residing on the secure storage appliance1004 provides complementary authentication connectivity. The serverconnection module 1008 establishes a secure connection with a clientdevice, exchanging encryption keys (e.g. public keys of a public/privatekey pair) with the client, to assist in securing data communicatedbetween the devices. The server connection module 1008 receivesconnection requests from a client, and determines whether toauthenticate that client.

Once authentication occurs, the connection module 1006 on the clientdevice 1002 can periodically send messages to the server connectionmodule 1008, to maintain connection between the devices such that theserver device continues to present the volume to the client device.Additional details regarding operation of the server connection moduleand presentment of data to the client device are discussed below inconjunction with FIG. 21.

As illustrated, the client device 1002 and secure storage appliance areconnected by a secure data connection 1010, such as can be establishedover a storage area network, as described above. In such an embodiment,the secure data connection 1010 can correspond to a connection over adata network, such as a connection between host bus adapters in a FibreChannel network, or addressable iSCSI ports, as described above.

In the embodiment shown, the secure storage appliance 1004 hosts a table1012 containing a list of client devices capable of connecting to aspecific volume. The client access information can be based on a name ofthe client device 1002, or a name or address of a communicationconnection (e.g. the host bus adapter) or other client-identifyinginformation. The table 1012 including client authentication informationcan optionally also incorporate or be integrated into the informationrelated to volume and share mapping, as illustrated. In the exampleshown, three volumes are available as mapped to physical devices andshares, listed as volumes X, Y, and Z, as indicated in the table 1012available to the secure storage appliance 1004. The client device 1002requests access to the secure storage appliance 1004, which finds theidentity of the client device within “Client Access List 1”, andpresents volume X to that client device, for example by using themethods and systems of FIG. 21, below. If the client device is alsoidentified within other client access lists, additional volumes may beauthorized to be presented as well.

Although the table 1012 is shown as having a specific form, it isunderstood that the data residing in the table can take many forms andbe arranged in many ways. For example, the table 1012 could be embodiedin a file, database, or directory system, and could include more or lessinformation than that shown.

FIG. 20 shows a flowchart of methods and systems 1100 for securing andretrieving data from a physical storage device, according to certainembodiments of the present disclosure. The methods and systems 1100 asdisclosed herein allow access of data (e.g. reading or writing of data)to or from a physical storage device hosting a share of a volume, asillustrated in FIG. 13, above.

Operational flow in the system 1100 is instantiated at a start operation1102. The start operation generally corresponds to initial access of ashare, such as upon associating a secure storage appliance with aphysical storage device and creation of a share, or upon introducing asecure storage appliance into a network having preexisting shares, suchthat volumes can be associated with the secure storage appliance asdescribed above. As described herein, the secure storage appliance canbe any of the embodiments of secure storage appliances described above,and can connect to a client device as described in conjunction with FIG.19. The client device can be any of a number of types of client devicespreviously described which are capable of authenticating its identity toa secure storage appliance.

Operational flow proceeds to a signature key module 1104, which obtainsa signature key, and uses that signature key to decrypt and readsignature information related to a share. In various embodiments, thesignature key can be held by the secure storage appliance, or by a keyserver communicatively connected thereto. The signature information isunique to each share of a volume, and therefore multiple signature keysmay be required to be used across multiple shares to obtain sufficientinformation about the shares associated with a volume. In certainembodiments, the signature information can include information that canbe used to identify the physical device upon which data (i.e. the share)is stored, as is required to construct the volume from each of theshares. In certain embodiments, the signature information can correspondto the signature 706 associated with share 700 a of FIG. 13.

Operational flow proceeds to a label module 1106. The label module 1106accesses the share label associated with each share, and obtainsinformation about the particular share. For example, this can includethe volume name and serial number of the physical volume on which theshare is stored. This can also include information about the virtualvolume with which the share is associated. Other information can beincluded as well.

Operational flow proceeds to an authentication module 1108. Theauthentication module 1108 determines whether a client is authorized toaccess data associated with a volume, such as the volume for whichinformation is retrieved as related to modules 1104-1106, above. Theauthentication module can, in certain embodiments, establish a secureconnection between the client device and the server device, such thatmessages communicated between the client device and the server cannot beintercepted or observed. Example methods of authentication include useof Kerberos or certificate-based authentication, as described below inconjunction with FIG. 21.

Operational flow proceeds to a volume presentation module 1110. Thevolume presentation module 1110 presents to the client device a volumethat client is authorized to view. The volume, as previously described,is associated with a plurality of shares, for each of which thesignature and header information has been accessed to determine itsavailability. At this point, a client device can address data requests,such as read requests, write requests, or other I/O requests. Othermethods and systems can be used to ensure proper presentation of one ormore available volumes to a user. Additional details regardingauthentication and volume presentation to a client device are describedin conjunction with FIG. 21, below.

Operational flow proceeds to a workgroup key module 1112. The workgroupkey module 1112 accesses a workgroup key associated with theauthenticated client. Each client can be associated with one or moreworkgroup keys, each of which is associated with one or more volumes.The workgroup keys are used to allow the client access to a virtual diskrepresenting data stored on the volume.

Operational flow proceeds to a session key module 1114. The session keymodule 1114 accesses a session key for use in accessing data (e.g. usingthe data module 1116, below). The session key module 1114 can access thesession key from the share directly, such as by reading a session keyfrom one of the headers in the share (e.g. as illustrated in FIG. 13).Alternatively, if the session key has previously been accessed, thesession key may be accessible by a secure storage appliance locally orfrom a database of keys used by the secure storage appliance. Thesession key module 1114 decrypts the session key using the workgroup keyobtained using the workgroup key module 1112.

In embodiments in which the session key is split and stored across aplurality of shares, the session key module 1114 accesses one or moreshares, as necessary to reconstitute the session key, and then decryptsthe split session key portions and reconstitutes the session key in amanner analogous to the methods used on data herein.

Operational flow proceeds to a data module 1116. The data module 1116operates on data in response to a data request received from the clientdevice. In the case of a read data request, the data module can encryptdata with a session key, by finding appropriate session keys associatedwith shares at which the data is cryptographically split and stored. Inthe case of a write data request, the data module 1116 can decrypt datawith an associated session key, and provide that data to the securestorage appliance for reconstitution with data from other shares toprovide requested data back to a client device. Typically, at least oneof the workgroup key module 1112, the session key module 1114, or thedata module 1116 is executed in response to or in advance of a datarequest from the client device, such that, when a data request (e.g. aread or write request) is made, a block of data can be accessed,decrypted/encrypted, and split/reconstituted to be provided to theclient device or stored at a share. Operational flow proceeds to an endoperation 1118, which signifies completion of handling of a data requestrelating to the share.

FIG. 21 shows a flowchart for methods and systems 1200 for presenting avirtual disk to a client device, according to a possible embodiment ofthe present disclosure. As shown, the methods and systems 1200 preventunauthorized client devices from accessing data, while allowingauthorized client devices to access data. This is accomplished byselectively presenting virtual disks to client devices, each of thevirtual disks associated with a volume and defining the authorizedclient devices. By presenting or hiding data on a virtual disk basis,each volume can be presented or masked from a user, allowing that userto view only their data stored at a physical disk even when other usersor user group's data is also stored on the same physical disk (e.g. inthe case of more than one volume sharing a physical disk by each storinga share on the physical disk). The methods and systems 1200 help preventan attacker from spoofing a client system by presenting clientidentification information identical to an authorized client device(e.g. by presenting a host bus adapter with a world wide name identicalto the one on an authorized client device).

Operational flow within the system 1200 is instantiated at a startoperation 1202, which corresponds to initial operation of a securestorage appliance in conjunction with a client device and a back enddata storage network, such as in the embodiments disclosed above inconjunction with FIGS. 3-16. Operational flow proceeds to a connectionmodule 1204, which corresponds to creation of a secure connectionbetween a client device and a secure storage device. The secureconnection can be created using Kerberos or certificate-basedauthentication, as described above in conjunction with FIG. 19. Thesecure connection can use exchanged keys, such as exchanged public keysof public/private key pairs of the client device and secure storageappliance, to create a secure session such that the communicationbetween the two systems cannot be eavesdropped on, and such that athird, unauthorized system cannot impersonate a legitimately authorizedclient device. Other methods of authentication can be used as well.

Operational flow proceeds to a client identification module 1206. Theclient identification module 1206 receives an indication from a clientidentifying the client, such as by providing a name of the client, aname of a communicative connection of the client (e.g. a port address orname of a host bus adapter), or other identifying information. Theclient identification module also optionally receives an indication of avolume to which the client is requesting access (e.g. by attemptingaccess of a virtual disk). The client identification module 1206 usesthis information to determine whether the client is authorized to accessthe volume (or any volume) available to be hosted by the secure storageappliance.

Operational flow proceeds to a volume presentment module 1208, whichcorresponds to the secure storage appliance determining whether theclient device is authorized and responding accordingly by presenting (ordenying access to) contents of a volume, as associated with the virtualdisk. The volume presentment module 1208 presents the volume to anauthorized client device as a virtual disk, such that the volume (whichis spread across shares on a plurality of physical storage devices)appears as a unitary storage device. In certain embodiments in which itis determined that the client is not authorized to view the contents ofa volume, the secure storage appliance can return status informationabout the volume to the client, but will prevent data access or viewingof contents of the volume. In other embodiments, the volume is blockedfrom presentment to the client system entirely. Other embodiments arepossible as well.

Operational flow proceeds to an unlock operation 1210, which determineswhether a volume presented to a client device should remain presented tothe client device. Typically a client device will periodically transmitunlock messages to a secure storage appliance during a period of time inwhich the client device is operational or is using the volume hosted bythe secure storage appliance. Likewise, alongside data requestsassociated with the volume, the client can transmit authenticationinformation that indicates that the client is continuing to access thevolume. At the secure storage appliance, the unlock operation 1210determines whether an unlock message has been received within apredetermined amount of time (e.g. within 1-2 minutes, or morefrequently depending upon the desired bandwidth of the overall networkto be consumed with unlock messages). If an unlock message has beenreceived, operational flow branches “yes” and proceeds to a returnmodule 1212, which refreshes the unlocked status of the volume, and thesecure storage appliance continues to present the volume to the clientdevice. The system 1200 repeats operation of the unlock operation andreturn module 1212, thereby maintaining availability of the volume tothe client, for the time during which the client requests access to thevolume. During this time, the secure storage appliance will receive andrespond to data requests (e.g. read and write requests) related to thevolume.

If no unlock message has been received at the secure storage appliancewithin the predetermined amount of time, operational flow branches “no”and proceeds to an end operation 1214, indicating that the volume ceasesto be presented to the client device.

In certain embodiments, upon ceasing to present the volume to the clientdevice, the client can still obtain status information about the volumefrom the secure storage appliance, for example by requesting statusinformation from the secure storage appliance over a still-open secureconnection generated by the connection module 1204. In otherembodiments, upon ceasing to present the volume to the client device,the secure connection is terminated as well (assuming that no othervolumes are currently being presented to the client device).

Now referring to FIGS. 22-23, systems and methods for updatingencryption keys in a secure data storage network such as those describedherein are explained in further detail. FIG. 22 shows a flowchart formethods and systems 1300 for replacing a workgroup key used to securedata stored using a secure storage appliance, according to certainembodiments of the present disclosure. The methods and systems 1300 asillustrated provide a process by which security can be strengthened byallowing a secure storage appliance or administrative device to refreshworkgroup keys, minimizing the chance that such keys can be possessed byan unauthorized user. If an unauthorized user has access to a workgroupkey, that user may be able to access one or more virtual disksassociated with that key. For example, a user at a client device may beauthorized to access certain virtual disks at a low security accesslevel, having little access or data editing capabilities; by obtaining aworkgroup key from another user, that first (now unauthorized) user ofthe wrongly-obtained workgroup key has an increased ability to access avirtual disk associated with a second (authorized) user, therebycompromising data stored in the volume associated with thewrongly-obtained workgroup key.

The methods and systems 1300 are instantiated at a start operation 1302,which corresponds to initiation of a key updating process, as could betriggered by an administrator or based on a scheduled key updatingoperation noted at a key server, secure storage appliance, or othercomponent of a secure data storage network as previously described.Operational flow proceeds to a key generation module 1304, whichgenerates a new workgroup key to be used in place of a preexistingworkgroup key. The key generation module 1304 typically operates on akey server or secure storage appliance to generate a key to be used as areplacement to one or more preexisting workgroup keys associated with aselected virtual disk and volume.

Operational flow proceeds to a decryption module 1306, which correspondsto decryption of each of the session keys at each share on a physicaldisk that is encrypted with the previously-used workgroup key. The keyserver or secure storage appliance determines all of the sharesassociated with volumes and virtual disks associated with a workgroupkey. Each share is accessed, and each of the headers associated with theshares (e.g. headers containing session keys or cryptograpghically splitportions of session keys) that are encrypted using the workgroup key aredecrypted using that key.

At this point in the system 1300, all of the session keys that werepreviously encrypted with the session key are now decrypted, and held bythe secure storage appliance and/or key server associated with theappliance. Operational flow proceeds to an encrypted key storage module1308, which corresponds to encryption with the new workgroup key of eachof the session keys decrypted with the decryption module 1306. Theencrypted key storage module 1308 stores the newly-encrypted sessionkeys within the shares on physical disks. In embodiments in which thesession key is cryptographically split prior to storage, the encryptedkey storage module 1308 also cryptographically splits the session keyacross each of the shares associated with the volume associated with thesession key, e.g. prior to the encryption of such portions of thesession key.

Operational flow proceeds to a workgroup key storage module 1310, whichcorresponds to storage of the workgroup key at a key server used formanaging key and virtual disk information. The workgroup key storagemodule 1310 updates information at a secure storage appliance, physicaldisk, and/or key server indicating that the new workgroup key is used todecrypt the session keys or session key portions. The workgroup keystorage module 1310 also optionally deletes (or schedules for deletion)the previously-used workgroup key. Operational flow terminates at an endoperation 1312, signifying completion of the re-keying process withrespect to a workgroup key.

In certain embodiments, the various modules of the system 1300 can beoperated in a different order, or could be operated in parallel. Forexample, the decryption module 1306 and the encrypted key storage module1308 can operate in tandem to access, decrypt and reencrypt session keyson a one-by-one basis. Other operational flows are possible as well

FIG. 23 shows a flowchart for methods and systems 1400 for replacing asession key used to secure data stored using a secure storage appliance,according to certain embodiments of the present disclosure. The methodsand systems 1400 illustrated provide a further process (alongsideprocess 1300 of FIG. 22) by which security can be strengthened byallowing a secure storage appliance or administrative device to refreshsession keys, minimizing the chance that such keys can be obtained andused to decrypt data on a share. If an unauthorized user has access to adecrypted session key, that user may be able to access data on a shareof a physical storage device, thereby accessing a portion of theinformation (i.e. the portion included in the share) required toreconstruct a volume.

The methods and systems 1400 are instantiated at a start operation 1402,which corresponds to initiating a process to replace one or more sessionkeys associated with a share stored on a physical storage device. Theprocess can, for example, be initiated by a scheduled operation on asecure storage appliance or key manager, or can be manually triggered byan administrator having sufficient access rights. Operational flowproceeds to a header creation module 1404, which creates new headerinformation to be stored in a share, including a new session key. Theheader creation module 1404 stores the header information in a reservedempty header location in the share, as indicated above in conjunctionwith FIG. 13. The header creation module 1404 can be performed, forexample, by a secure storage appliance or key manager within a securedata storage network. In embodiments in which the session key is splitacross each of the shares, the header creation module 1404 creates a newheader containing cryptographically split portions of each session keyto be stored in the share.

Operational flow proceeds to a marking module 1406, which operates tomark a preexisting header as a previous or “stale” header to be replacedby the header and session key generated by the header creation module1404.

From the marking module 1406, operational flow proceeds both to arequest module 1408 and a sideband reencryption module 1416. Thesideband reencryption module 1416 initiates a sideband operation bywhich all of the data that is stored in a share and encrypted with asession key of the stale header information (referred to herein as a“stale” session key), is decrypted with that key, reencrypted using anew session key created by the header creation module 1404, and restoredwithin the share in its updated state.

The procedure performed by the sideband reencryption module 1416 cantake substantial time, and may be performed during operation of a securedata storage network. Therefore, data requests may be received by asecure storage appliance and targeted at the share in which the sessionkey is being updated. In the case of a write request, the data to bewritten will be encrypted with the newly-created session key in the newheader. In the case of a read request, the receive data request module1408 corresponds to receipt of a data request (e.g. a read request) at asecure storage appliance that is targeted for data in the share having asession key replaced. A request assessment operation 1410 determineswhether the read request addresses data stored using the new session keyor the stale session key. This can be accomplished, for example, byreading the block of data and the associated identifier of a session keyto be used to decrypt the data (as referenced in conjunction with thesecondary data blocks 712 of FIG. 13, above). If the request assessmentoperation 1410 determines that the stale session key was used,operational flow branches “yes” to a stale key module 1412. If therequest assessment operation 1410 determines that a new session key wasused, operational flow branches “no” to a new key module 1414.

Both the stale key module 1412 and the new key module 1414 operate todecrypt the requested data block, with each using a respective stale ornew session key to decrypt the data for reconstitution of a primary datablock to be returned to a client device. Operational flow proceeds to anend operation 1418, which corresponds to completion of key replacement(e.g. by the sideband reencryption module 1416) and any intervening dataread requests.

Now referring to FIGS. 24-25, various details of administrative rolesavailable within a secure data storage network are described, as well asmethods of managing administrative access to settings of one or moresecure storage appliances. FIG. 24 shows a hierarchical arrangement 1500of administrative access rights useable in a secure data storagenetwork, according to a possible embodiment of the present disclosure.The arrangement 1500 includes a plurality of administrative accesslevels and associated settings allowed to be altered by administrativeusers of the secure data storage networks and systems herein at thecorresponding access level.

In the embodiment shown, the arrangement 1500 presents a hierarchy ofadministrative access levels, including a security administrator 1502, adomain administrator 1504, an administrator 1506, an audit administrator1508, a crypto administrator 1510, a user 1512, and a guest 1514. Otheradministrative access levels are possible as well. The securityadministrator access level 1502 allows the administrative user to editglobal security settings, such as by assigning specific administrativeoperations and/or security settings for each of the administrativeaccess levels. The security administrator access level 1502 also can beallowed to edit administrative access levels of other specific users anddefine security groups of users having common administrative accesslevels. The domain administrator access level 1504 allows theadministrative user to control the creation and deletion of accounts andaccount groups within a domain. The administrator access level 1506allows the administrative user to create and destroy volumes or groupsof users, to the extent allowed by the security administrator. The auditadministrator access level 1508 allows the administrator to alter auditlogs. The crypto administrator access level 1510 allows theadministrator to control access to the various keys available within thesecure data storage network (e.g. the signature keys, workgroup keys,and session keys described above). The user access level 1512 allows theuser to access data on volumes presented to that user, as configured byan administrator having such capabilities (e.g. having administratoraccess 1506 or higher). The guest access level 1514 allows a user tomonitor the status of devices managed within a secure data storagenetwork, but prevents access of data within the network.

In certain embodiments, the various administrative access levels arehierarchical and inherit each of the rights of all lower administrativeaccess levels. This provides for a centralized administrative scheme,which, in certain circumstances, may subject a network to datavulnerability, based on the ability to access an account of a singlesecurity administrator. So, in alternative embodiments, the variousadministrative access levels do not inherit the administrative rights ofother lower access levels, and another administrative user may be deniedaccess to a security group or denied the capability of performing anadministrative operation unless an appropriate administrative accesslevel is individually assigned to a user. This can help prevent datavulnerabilities by deterring assignment of all security rights to asingle administrator. Distributed administrative access rights (ratherthan centralized administrative access rights) can also help preventconflict between administrator operations that may be occurring. Forexample, an administrator having audit administrator access level 1508may require the ability to edit audit logs, whereas other administratorsmay wish to edit audit records but should not be provided such anopportunity due to the possibility of editing over the auditadministrator or tampering with audit logs. Other arrangements ofadministrative access are possible as well.

FIG. 25 shows a flowchart for methods and systems 1600 for accessingadministrative settings in a secure storage appliance, according to apossible embodiment of the present disclosure. The methods and systems1600 provide a process by which administrative access can occur, wherebyeach administrative access is assessed to determine whether appropriateadministrative access rights are associated with the administrative userrequesting the administrative operation.

Operational flow is instantiated at a start operation 1602, whichcorresponds to a user attempting to access one or more administrativesettings of a secure storage appliance within a secure data storagenetwork, such as the various networks described herein. Operational flowproceeds to a receive access request module 1604, which corresponds toreceipt of the access request at a secure storage appliance oradministrative console connected thereto. The access request receivedvia the receive access request module 1604 includes an identification ofthe user attempting administrative access, such as a login name andpassword, biometric information (e.g. fingerprint) or other reliableidentification information. The receive access request module 1604 alsoidentifies the specific administrative action to be performed.Operational flow proceeds to a security check module 1606, whichcompares the received identification information against a database ofknown administrators.

A security assessment module 1608 determines whether the user hassufficient access rights to perform a requested operation. A user may ormay not have sufficient access rights to perform an administrativeaction in a secure data storage network based upon (1) theadministrative access rights available to the user and (2) the specificadministrative action requested to be taken. For example, a user having“crypto administrator” access rights, as defined in FIG. 24, would beable to initiate the key replacement operations described in FIGS.22-23, whereas a user having “guest” access rights would not have such aright. Similarly, the user having the “crypto administrator” accessrights would not be able to create or destroy volumes or shares withinthe secure data storage network, whereas an individual having “domainadministrator” or “administrator” access rights would be able to editvolume arrangements. Other examples are apparent as well, and aredependent upon the number and type of different administrative accessfunctions provided, as well as the number and type of administrativeaccess levels defined.

If it is determined that the user has sufficient access rights toperform the requested administrative operation, operational flowbranches “yes” and proceeds to an allowance module 1610, which allowsperformance of the administrative operation. In contrast, if it isdetermined that the user does not have sufficient access rights (e.g.the user is not an administrator or otherwise is not an administratorhaving the specific right to perform the administrative operationrequested), operational flow branches “no” and proceeds to a blockmodule 1612, which blocks performance of the administrative operation.From either the allowance module 1610 or the block module 1612,operational flow continues to an audit record module 1614, which recordsthe administrative access attempt and action taken. An end operation1616 corresponds to a completed access attempt to perform anadministrative operation (successfully or unsuccessfully).

It is understood that, using the systems and methods of FIGS. 24-25,multiple types of hierarchies of administrative access rights can becreated. For example, in certain embodiments, a security administratorhas access to and can perform any of a number of administrativeoperations allowed within the secure data storage network. In otherembodiments, the rights to perform of administrative operations are tobe dispersed to different administrators, and the security administratorcan grant or deny rights to perform administrative operations, butcannot perform such operations themselves. Likewise, otheradministrative rights can be either collected or dispersed among aplurality of administrators having different administrative accesslevels.

It is recognized that the above networks, systems, and methods operateusing computer hardware and software in any of a variety ofconfigurations. Such configurations can include computing devices, whichgenerally include a processing device, one or more computer readablemedia, and a communication device. Other embodiments of a computingdevice are possible as well. For example, a computing device can includea user interface, an operating system, and one or more softwareapplications. Several example computing devices include a personalcomputer (PC), a laptop computer, or a personal digital assistant (PDA).A computing device can also include one or more servers, one or moremass storage databases, and/or other resources.

A processing device is a device that processes a set of instructions.Several examples of a processing device include a microprocessor, acentral processing unit, a microcontroller, a field programmable gatearray, and others. Further, processing devices may be of any generalvariety such as reduced instruction set computing devices, complexinstruction set computing devices, or specially designed processingdevices such as an application-specific integrated circuit device.

Computer readable media includes volatile memory and non-volatile memoryand can be implemented in any method or technology for the storage ofinformation such as computer readable instructions, data structures,program modules, or other data. In certain embodiments, computerreadable media is integrated as part of the processing device. In otherembodiments, computer readable media is separate from or in addition tothat of the processing device. Further, in general, computer readablemedia can be removable or non-removable. Several examples of computerreadable media include, RAM, ROM, EEPROM and other flash memorytechnologies, CD-ROM, digital versatile disks (DVD) or other opticalstorage, magnetic cassettes, magnetic tape, magnetic disk storage orother magnetic storage devices, or any other medium that can be used tostore desired information and that can be accessed by a computingdevice. In other embodiments, computer readable media can be configuredas a mass storage database that can be used to store a structuredcollection of data accessible by a computing device.

A communications device establishes a data connection that allows acomputing device to communicate with one or more other computing devicesvia any number of standard or specialized communication interfaces suchas, for example, a universal serial bus (USB), 802.11 a/b/g network,radio frequency, infrared, serial, or any other data connection. Ingeneral, the communication between one or more computing devicesconfigured with one or more communication devices is accomplished via anetwork such as any of a number of wireless or hardwired WAN, LAN, SAN,Internet, or other packet-based or port-based communication networks.

The above specification, examples and data provide a completedescription of the manufacture and use of the composition of theinvention. Since many embodiments of the invention can be made withoutdeparting from the spirit and scope of the invention, the inventionresides in the claims hereinafter appended.

1. A system for administrative management of a secure data storagenetwork utilizing cryptographically splitting data as it is stored andretrieved from storage devices, the system comprising: a secure storageappliance configured to host a plurality of volumes, each volumeassociated with a plurality of shares stored on a correspondingplurality of physical storage devices and having a plurality of volumemanagement settings; wherein each volume is accessible by a group of oneor more users, each user assigned an administrative access level, thegroup of one or more users defines a separate community of interest;wherein the volume management settings are editable by a first user fromthe group of one or more users associated with the volume and assignedan administrative access level sufficient to edit the volume managementsettings; wherein the volume management settings are inaccessible by asecond user from outside the group of one or more users associated withthe volume and assigned an administrative access level at least equal tothat of the first user; wherein the cryptographically splitting datautilize a plurality of encryption keys to create a plurality of separatecommunity of interest data sets in which the primary write requests andcorresponding plurality of secondary write request are members of thecommunity of interest associated with the one of the plurality ofencryption keys used in the write requests.
 2. The system of claim 1,wherein the volume management settings are inaccessible by a third userfrom among the group of one or more users associated with the volume andassigned an administrative access level lower than that of the firstuser.
 3. The system of claim 1, wherein the administrative access levelis selected from among a group of administrative access levels.
 4. Thesystem of claim 1, wherein the volume management settings include userrights relating to the volume.
 5. The system of claim 1, wherein thevolume management settings include an ability to create or destroyvolumes.
 6. A system for administrative management of a secure datastorage network network utilizing cryptographically splitting data as itis stored and retrieved from storage devices, the system comprising: asecure storage appliance configured to host a plurality of volumes, eachvolume associated with a plurality of shares stored on a correspondingplurality of physical storage devices and having a plurality of volumemanagement settings; a security group definition designating a pluralityof security groups, each security group associated with a volume andassigned to a security administrator, wherein volume management settingsof a volume associated with one of the plurality of security groups areeditable by the security administrator associated with the securitygroup, the security group of one or more users defines a separatecommunity of interest; wherein the cryptographically splitting datautilize a plurality of encryption keys to create a plurality of separatecommunity of interest data sets in which the primary write requests andcorresponding plurality of secondary write request are members of thecommunity of interest associated with the one of the plurality ofencryption keys used in the write requests.
 7. The system of claim 6,wherein the security group definition is editable by a security groupadministrator different from the security administrator.
 8. The systemof claim 6, wherein the security administrator is a domainadministrator.
 9. The system of claim 6, wherein the secure storageappliance is located within a domain, and wherein the security groupcorresponds to the users able to access the domain.
 10. A method ofaccessing administrative settings in a secure storage appliance networkutilizing cryptographically splitting data as it is stored and retrievedfrom storage devices, the method comprising: receiving a request foradministrative access to a volume managed by the secure storageappliance, the volume associated with a plurality of shares stored on aplurality of physical storage devices, the request including anidentifier of an administrative user; checking an administrative accesslevel to determine access rights of the administrative user; respondingto the request for administrative access based on an outcome of checkingthe administrative access level; and generating a log record of thereceived request for administrative access; wherein the administrativeuser lacks access rights to a second volume different from the volumeassociated with a share stored on the plurality of physical storagedevices; wherein the cryptographically splitting data utilize aplurality of encryption keys to create a plurality of separate communityof interest data sets in which the primary write requests andcorresponding plurality of secondary write request are members of thecommunity of interest associated with the one of the plurality ofencryption keys used in the write requests.
 11. The method of claim 10,wherein responding to the request for administrative access includes,upon determining that the administrative user has sufficient accessrights to the volume, providing administrative access to the volume tothe administrative user.
 12. The method of claim 10, wherein respondingto the request for administrative access includes, upon determining thatthe administrative user lacks sufficient access rights to the volume,denying administrative access to the volume to the administrative user.13. The method of claim 10, wherein a second administrative user has anassociated administrative access level sufficient to allowadministrative access to the second volume to the second administrativeuser.
 14. The method of claim 10, further comprising allowing a securityadministrator to edit the access rights of the administrative user. 15.The method of claim 10, wherein the security administrator lacks atleast one of the access rights associated with the administrative user.16. The method of claim 10, further comprising allowing an auditadministrator to view the log record.
 17. The method of claim 10,wherein the request for administrative access includes a request toperform an administrative function of the secure storage appliance. 18.The method of claim 17, wherein the administrative access level definesadministrative functions allowable to the administrative user.
 19. Themethod of claim 18, wherein the administrative functions include editingcryptographic settings, viewing audit logs, editing volume settings,editing user group settings, accessing encryption keys, and definingadministrative access levels.
 20. The method of claim 10, whereinchecking an administrative access level to determine access rights ofthe administrative user is based on the identifier of the administrativeuser.